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SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
BE LIMITED TO SALES TRANSACTIONS?
The purpose of this discussion is to examine implied warranties in order
to determine if their application is limited to sales transactions. In approaching
this problem, it is necessary to understand the development of warranty. In
the early law, warranty was a pure action of tort.' Special assumpsit developed
over a hundred years later than warranty 2 and was based on the tort action
of warranty.3 Thus, at the beginning, assumpsit was thought of as a tort
action.4 Later assumpsit came to be regarded as similar to covenant and
hence became classified with contract actions. 5 Warranty was still considered
a tort action, and it was not until 1778 in 'Stuart v. Wilkins 6 that an action
of warranty was brought in assumpsit.7 It was in this manner that the obli-
gation of a warrantor came to be thought of as contractual in nature.
Warranty cannot be said to be strictly a matter of contract. In any
transaction, there may be an express contract of warranty, but this does not
rule out other warranties. For example, A warrants to B that a particular
horse is sound.8 The courts hold such a representation of fact to be a war-
ranty.9 Where there is such a positive representation, the seller's actual intent
to warrant is generally held immaterial.10 It follows that if the intent of the
seller is immaterial, the obligation is one imposed by law.
One point must be kept in mind when warranties are being considered.
Some courts have spoken in terms of warranty and then have proceeded on
the basis of negligence." Actually, the effect of a warranty is to impose an
absolute liability on the warrantor.'
2
1. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 197 (3d ed. 1948); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2
HARv. L. REv 1 (1888).
2. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1888).
3. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K. B. 1778).
7. PROSSER, TORTS § 82 (1941); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948); Ames,
The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1888).
8. The older cases held such statements to be opinion and therefore no basis for a
warranty. Tyre v. Causey, 4 Harr. 425 (Del. 1846) ; Turner Bros. v. Clarke, 143 Ga. 44,
84 S. E. 116 (1915) ; Wells v. Welch, 205 Mo. App. 136, 224 S. W. 120 (1920) ; Erwin
v. Maxwell, 7 N. C. 241, 9 Am. Dec. 602 (1819).
9. McClintock v. Emick, 87 Ky. 160, 7 S. W. 903 (1888); Ormsby v. Budd, 72
Iowa 80, 33 N. W. 457 (1887) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 201 n. 13 (3d ed. 1948).
10. Ingraham v. Union R. R., 19 R. I. 356, 33 Atl. 875, 876 (1896): "[I]f the
representation as to the character or quality of the article sold be positive, and not mere
matter of opinion, and the vendee understands it and relies upon it as a warranty, the
vendor is bound thereby, no matter whether he intended it to be a warranty or not." See
also Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U. S. 575, 7 Sup. Ct. 1283, 30 L. Ed. 1172 (1887) ; 1 WILLis-
TON, SALES § 201 (3d ed. 1948).
11. E.g., Dam v. Lake Aliso Riding School, 6 Cal. 2d 395, 57 P. 2d 1315 (1936);
Moore v. Ardmore, 188 Okla. 74, 106 P. 2d 515 (1940).
12. Lollar v. Jones, 229 Ala. 329, 157 So. 209 (1934); Pelletier v. DuPont, 124 Me.
675
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Implied warranties arose where there was no representation or contract
of warranty in regard to the transaction. At the early law, the seller was not
liable when the article which he sold was of bad quality where there was
neither warranty nor representation. 13 But since 1815, in Gardiner v. Gray,14
it is certain that in many cases the seller is under an obligation to furnish
merchantable goods although there are no representations or warranties as
to the quality.15 This obligation came to be known as implied warranty. As in
the case of express warranty, the effect of this obligation is to place an
absolute liability on the w'arrantor.16 It is not necessary that the warrantor be
guilty of any negligence. Such is the. setled law of England 17 and the over-
whelming weight of authority in this country.' s
While a few jurisdictions state that implied warranties arise from the
intention of the parties, 19 the accepted view is that they arise by operation
of law.20 This was well expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court,: "An
implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements of an agreement. It
is not one of the essential elements to be stated in the contract, nor does its
application or effective existence rest or depend upon the affirmative inten-
tion of the parties. It is a child of the law. It, because of the acts of the parties,
is imposed by the law. It arises independently and outside of the contract.
The law annexes it to the contract.
' 21
The most important class of cases in which warranties have been implied
is that concerning a contract to sell or a present sale of goods. Here Section
15 of the Uniform Sales Act is now recognized as the law with regard to
269, 128 At1. 186, 39 A. L, R. 972 (1925) ; Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App.
Div. 648, 200 N. Y. Supp. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Rodgers & Co. v. Niles & Co., 11 Ohio
St. 48, 78 Am. Dec. 290 (1860) ; Leopold v. Van Kirk, 27 Wis. 152 (1870).
13. 1 WILLIsToN, SALES § 228 (3d ed. 1948).
14. 4 Camp. 144, 145, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (N. P. 1815): "[U]nder such tircum-
stances, the purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering the description
in the contract. Without any particular warranty, this is an implied term in every such
contract. Where there is no opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of caveat
emptor does not apply. He cannot without a warranty insist that it shall be of any par-
ticular quality'of fineness, but the intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it
shall be saleable in the market under the denomination mentioned in the contract be-
tween them." , -
15. 1 WmLisroN, SALES § 228 (3d ed. 1948): "[I]t has not been doubted that in
some cases at least the seller of goods is under an obligation to furnish goods which
are at least merchantable though no agreement or representation as to quality was made."
16. See note 12 supra.
17. Randall v. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102 (1877); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 237 (3d ed.
1948).
18. Lollar v. Jones, 229 Ala. 329, 157 So. 209 (1934); Patterson v. Orangeburg
Fertilizer Co., 117 S. C. 140, 108 S. E. 401 (1921); Tennessee River Compress Co. v.
Leeds & Company, 97 Tenn. 574, 37 S. W. 389 (1896).
19. Burntisland Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel Product Corp., 278 Fed. 552 (D. Del.
1922) ; Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal. App. 156, 259 Pac. 108 (1927).
20. J. B. Holt-Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889 (1926) ; Sterling-Midland
Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & C. Co., 334 Ill. 281, 165 N. E. 793 (1929) ; Bekkevold
v. Potts, 173 Minn.,87, 216 N: W. 790, 59 A. L. R. 1164 (1927) ; Allis-Chalmers Mfg.,
Co. v. Frank, 57-N. D. .295, 221 N. W. 75 (1928); VoLD, SALES 468 (1931), 1 WILLIsTOx.
SALES § 239b. (3d ed. 1948).
21. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790, 791, 59 A. L. R. 1164 (1927).
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implied warranties in most jurisdictions.22 While this section materially
broadens the concept of implied warranty in many states,23 it is merely a
statement of the common law in other jurisdictions.24 The main element in
such cases is reliance by the buyer on the seller.
In spite of care and honesty on the part of the seller, it is generally teemed
that he should bear the risk that his title may be defective. The seller is in
better position than the buyer to know the antecedents that affect his title
and the quality of the thing sold.
The doctrine of implied warranty still finds its largest application in the
law of sales. The idea has been expressed that it is peculiar to that kind of
transaction. Why should the doctrine be confined to sales? It rests on an
implied representation of fact. The expediency and justice of implying such
a representation and warranty may,be as cogent in other forms of transactions
as in sales. This discussion will deal with four other situations in which
implied warranties may be used. One who makes a bailment, grants a license
for the grantor's benefit and a warranty may be implied as to the bailed chattel.
An individual who purports to act as an agent and thus to bind an alleged
principal can reasonably be deemed to make warranties just as though the
transaction were one that could technically be called a "sale," And in the
restaurant cases, courts have labored with the question of whether ihe food
was "sold" or whether the customer only had a license to eat it. Why should
that question make any difference? Some recent "pop bottle" cases have
turned on the question of whether a "sale" had taken place. Need the impli-
cation of a warranty be so technical?
In several groups of cases the courts have shown a commendable tendency
to recognize that the doctrine of implied warranties is one of broad application.
BAILoR-BArLEE
What is the liability of the bailor with regard to the bailed chattel? 25
In many cases the courts have based liability on negligence. 26 For instance
the livery-stable keeper who rents horses 27 or the modem day "U-Drive-It"
company 28 is liable on this basis. In other situations the courts speak the
22. 1 U. L. A. § 15 (1931).
23. Sampson v. Frank F. Pels Co., 199 App. Div. 854, 192 N. Y. Supp. 538 (1st
Dep't 1922); Ward v. Valker, 44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W. 129 (1920); Keenan v. Cherry
& Webb, 47 R. I. 125, 131 Atl. 309 (1925).
24. Davenport Ladder Co. v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 43 F. 2d 63 (8th Cir.
1930); Hoback v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 20 Tenn. App. 280, 98 S. W. 2d 113
(M. S. 1936).
25. See generally 8 C. J. S., Baflinents § 25 (1938).
26. Akers v. Overbeck, 18 Misc. 198, 41 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1896) ; Kissam
v. Jones, 56 Hun 432, 10 N. Y. Supp. 94 (1890) ; Con v. Hunsberger, 224 Pa. 154, 73
Atl. 324, 25 L. R. A. (N.s.) 372 (1909).
27. Dam v. Lake Aliso Riding School, 6 Cal. 2d 395, 57 P. 2d 1315 (1936) ; Conn
v. Hunsberger, 224 Pa. 154, 73 AtI. 324, 25 L. R. A. (z.s.) 372 (1909). -
28. Milestone System v. Gasior, 160 Md. 131, 152 Atl. 810 (1931); Mitchell v.
1949 ]
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language of implied warranty yet base liability on negligence. Certain English
cases call the obligation implied warranty yet limit it so that the bailor is not
responsible for defects that cannot be discovered. 29 American courts have
similar theories. Thus in Moore v. Ardmore,30 the court said, "the implied
warranty-must be taken and understood in a reasonable sense .... It is not
a broad, absolute warranty, but one that will reasonably serve the particular
case."
There are cases, however, which imply a true warranty in the bailor-
bailee relationship. In one case a a defective tank was loaned for storing
gasoline. The court found an implied warranty that the tank was reasonably
fit for storing gasoline. The opinion states that "Such warranty is not confined
to sales; it exists in cases of bailment. '3 2 Another opinion holds that the
implied warranty of fitness "applies with equal force, if not with stronger
reason to the case of a lease of goods for a particular purpose." 33 The New
York Court of Appeals said that "The implication of a warranty of fitness
is not peculiar to the law of sales; it arises in cases of bailment." 34
The cases referred to above and others 35 clearly show that a true implied
warranty has been found in many bailment situations. The fact that the trans-
action is not a sale does not prevent the imposition of an implied warranty.
"One who lets property for hire may reasonably be subjected to the same
implied warranties as one who sells goods .... Analogy with the law of sales
justifies the further statement that if the hirer reasonably relied on the bailor's
superior skill or knowledge in furnishing suitable property, the latter would
be liable even though in fact ignorant of the defects in the goods which he
furnished." 36
Although technically not a bailment, one other case is relevant. In
Silverman v. Imperial London Hotels,37 a case involving the renting out of a
facility, the plaintiff was bitten by bugs while in the Turkish bath of the
defendant. There was evidence that the defendant's premises were most
scientific, hygienic and up-to-date. The court held that there was an implied
warranty that the premises were reasonably fit for use as a Turkish bath. This
was an absolute liability as shown by the opinion. The court stated that if the
Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266, 189 N. E. 39 (1934) ; Carroll v. Minneapolis Drive Yourself
System, 206 Wis. 287, 239 N. W. 501 (1931).
29. 1 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND §§ 1241-42 (Hailsham ed. 1931).
30. 188 Okla. 74, 106 P. 2d 515, 517 (1940).
31. Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Boyle, 231 .App. Div. 101, 246 N. Y. Supp.
142 (4th Dep't 1930).
32. 246 N. Y. Supp. at 144.
33. Hartford Battery Sales Corp. v. Price, 119 Pa. Super. 165, 181 Atl. 95, 98 (1935).
34: In re People, 250 N. Y. 410, 165 N. E. 829, 832 (1929).
35. Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N. Y. 30, 142 N. E. 342, 31 A. L. R.
536 (1923); Welder Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 15 Ohio App. 270 (1921); Hilton v.
Wagner, 10 Tenn. App. 173 (E. S. 1928); Milwaukee Tank Works v. Metals Coatinp
Co., 196 Wis. 191, 218 N. W. 835 (1928).
36. 4 WLLISTOX, CONTRACTS § 1041 (Rev. ed. 1936).
37. 137 L. T. Rep. 57, 43 T. L. Rep. 260 (K. B. 1927).
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premises were not reasonably fit, it did not matter that every possible step
was taken to put them in proper condition. Here is another example of a
situation where there is no sale, but a warranty.
IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN SERVICE OF FOOD
Is the liability of a restaurant based only on negligence or is strict liability
imposed? The starting point is to notice the oft cited statement that the serv-
ice of food is not a sale, but an utterance.38 Following this line of reasoning,
many courts say since there, is no sale, no warranty can be implied.3 9 Other
arguments are to the effect that there is no historical basi§ for an insurer's
liability on the part of one serving food.40 It is further stated that the protection
to the public should lie with the pure food acts.41 Still another argument is
that such liability would lead to unfounded claims. 4 2 The theory is advanced
that an implied warranty would not be expressive of the obligation between
the parties.43 Probably the most honest courts are those who state such liability
would be an undue burden on restaurants.
44
On the other hand, it appears that the common' law of England was to
the effect that it was an implied term of the restaurant contract that the guest
be furnished wholesome food.45 "If a man goes into a tavern for refreshment,
and corrupt meat or drink is there sold to him, which occasions his sickness,
an action clearly lies against the tavern keeper. . . .An action lies against
him without express warranty for it is a warranty in law." 46 There were
similar holdings in this country even before the Sales Act. In Thompson Co.
v. Smit, 47 the plaintiff was injured by a bad grapefruit served at defendant's
restaurant. The Tennessee court held that: "It [the restaurant] ought to be
held to conclusively know the condition and fitness of food it sells for imme-
diate use and consumption. . . . It is not claimed that defendant was guilty
of any negligence, and in fact the suit is not predicated on the negligence of
the defendant in knowing the condition of its food or in selecting an unwhole-
some grapefruit for plaintiff's immediate use. . . . [T]here ought to be, and
38. BEALE, INNKEEPERS § 169 (1906) ; Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 255, 88 Eng. Rep.
1303 (K. B. 1697) ; Crisp v. Pratt, Cro. Car. 549, 79 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K. B. 1635).
39. Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519, 520 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) ; Albrecht v. Rubin-
stein, 63 A. 2d 158 (Conn. 1948) ; Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atl. 533, L. R. A.
1915B 481 (1914); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N. H. 427, 128 Atl. 343 (1925); Nisky v.
Childs Co., 103 N. J. L. 464, 135 Atl. 805, 50 A. L. R. 227 (1927).
40. Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F. 2d 439 (5th Cir. 1934).
44. Ibid.
45. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407 (1918); Ames,
The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1888), citing cases from the Yearbooks;
1 BL. Comt. *430; 3 BL. Comm. *165; 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 241, 242 (1948).
46. Keil. 91, 72 Eng. Rep. 254 (K. B. 1585); Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644,
647, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348 (Ex. 1847).
47. 8 Tenn. C. C. A. 95 (1917).
1949 ]
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we think there is, a law that holds the seller liable on an implied warranty
that the grapefruit is reasonably fit and suitable for the purpose for which
it was intended." 48 Other jurisdictions, including California 49 and Kansas,
0
have similar holdings.
Since the Sales Act an increasing number of jurisdictions have found the
service of food implies a warranty under the Sales Act.51 The basic reason
for allowing recovery in such cases is well stated by the Rhode Island court:
"'The relation between a restaurant keeper and a customer originates in con-
tract. By selecting and ordering food, the customer makes known to the
restaurant keeper not only what food he wants, but also that he expects to
receive food fit for human consumption. An inspection of the food by the
,customer is generally impractical. . . . The customer must of necessity rely
upon the skill and judgment of the restaurant keeper to furnish him for a
stated price the kind of food that he orders and expects to receive." 52 The
rationale furnishes a reasonable legal vehicle for recovery. All the elements of
an implied warranty seem to be present. The restaurant keeper knows the
purpose it is to be used for; the customer relies upon his skill and judgment.
Much has been written on the question of whether a sale exists in such
instances.53 But many writers feel that the decision as to sale or not obscures
the real issue.54 It should be kept in mind that implied warranties are not
limited to sales alone.
55
Even if a particular court is averse to finding a sale, recovery may still
be had. In Cushing v. Rodman,56 the plaintiff was injured by a pebble which
was imbedded in a roll he was eating in defendant's restaurant. There was no
negligence on the part of the defendant. Recovery was allowed. The court
did not dwell on the question of a sale. There is some contractual relation
which will allow the implication of a warranty. It seems desirable to hold the
restaurant keeper strictly liable, in view of the near impossible task of proving
negligence.57 The plaintiff must find evidence of such negligence on premises
48. Id. at 103-104.
49. Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 59 P. 2d 142 (1936).
50. Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53 P. 2d 878 (1936).
51. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407 (1918); Temple
v. Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924); West v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Super. 118,
162 Atl. 685 (1932) ; Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 184 App. Div. 317, 171' N. Y. Supp. 840
(1st Dep't 1918); Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (1919);
Yochem v. Gloria, 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N. E. 2d 731 (1938) ; Ford v. Waldorf System,
57 R. I. 131, 188 Atl. 633 (1936) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242b (3d ed. 1948).
52. Ford v. Waldorf System, 57 R. I. 131, 188 Atl. 633, 636 (1936).
53. Notes, 15 FORD. L. Rav. 92 (1946), 24 MARQ. L. Rav. 155 (1940); 25 CALIF. L.
Rav. 117 (1936) ; 27 MicH. L. REv. 477 (1929).
54. See 27 MicE. L. REv. 477, 478 (1929), wherein it is stated that the question
of sale or not seems to be one of policy. The real question is should the plaintiff be
given an additional remedy to spare him the task of proving negligence. See 25 CALIF,
L. REv. 117 (1936), to the effect that no attempt should be made to impose liability
under section 15 of the Sales Act since resort to the Sales Act obscures the real issue,
55. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242b (1948); Note, 27 YALE L. J. 1068 (1918).
56. 8a F. 2d 864 (D. C. Cir. 1936).
57. Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F. 2d 864 (D. C. Cir. 1936) ; VOLD, SALES § 153 (1931).
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controlled by the defendant from employees of the defendant. It is not clear
that such liability would mean an undue burden. Speaking in an economic
sense, it would appear that the defendant could better stand the loss and
distribute it over his business. 5 8 Such liability would encourage higher stand-
ards by those engaged in the service of food to the public.
Cases arise not only where the restaurant keeper has prepared food,
but where he serves food which is prepared by others in a form not subject
to inspection without destroying the marketability of such food. The Maine
court held in such a situation that the parties have an equal opportunity of
inspection and refused to imply a warranty.59 In other cases, including Cush-
ing v. Rodinan,60 are to the effect that the restaurant is the one to bear the
loss.61 This latter view seems preferable since the basis of implied warranty
is strict liability, not the opportunity of the restaurant to thoroughly inspect
the food it serves.
The trend today is in the direction of absolute liability on the restaurant.
This seems desirable, and it may be done by means of implied warranty
with no stretching of legal principles. 62 In the first place, a sale may be found-
But, warranties are not limited to sales. The following quotation from Willis-
ton is appropriate, "Even though the transaction is not a sale, every argument
for implying a warranty in the sale of food is applicable with even greater
force to the serving of food to a guest or customer at an inn or restaurant.
The basis of implied warranty is justifiable reliance on the judgment or skill
of the warrantor, and to charge the seller of an unopened can of food for
the consequences of the inferiority of the contents of the can, and to hold free
from liability a restaurant keeper who opens the can on his pfemises and
serves its contents to a customer, would be a strange inconsistency. A sale
is not the only transaction ir which a warranty may be implied." 63
AGENT'S IMPLIED WARRANTY OF AUTHORITY
Where a person, acting as an agent, has contracted with another on
behalf of a certain principal, but without authority, the question ,is raised:
Upon whom should the responsibility for the consequences of the unauthorized
transaction fall? Since the assumed principal is not liable,64 the loss must be
58. Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F. 2d 864 (D. C. Cir. 1936).
59. Bigelow v. Maine Cent. R. R., 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396 ('1912).
60. 82 F. 2d 864 (D. C. Cir. 1936).
61. Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (1919); S. H. Kress
& Co. v. Ferguson, 60 S. W. 2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Morelli v. Fitch and
Gibbons, [1928] 2 K. B. 636; Wren v. Holt, [1903] 1 K. B. 610.
62. Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949). It is stated that
there is "in this country a warranty of wholesomeness peculiar to the sale of food,
based on the public policy of protecting the community from unwholesome provisions."
Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability, 5 IOWA L. BULL. 86 (1919).
63. 1 WILLISTON, SALEs § 242b (1948).
64. "No obligation can be imposed upon the principal by the act of the agent outside




borne either by the agent or the third party. Of these latter two persons,
the agent should assume the risk, for he has induced reliance and change of
position by a third party because of express or implied representations of
authority.
65
If, then, the agent is to be held responsible, upon what basis is his liability
founded? In most jurisdictions today the agent is not liable on the unauthor-
ized contract.66 For example, "Wisconsin in common with many other states
no longer adheres to the doctrine that the agent is liable upon the contract
itself." 67 Instead it is held that "An agent impliedly warrants his authority
to make the representations through which he induces another to make a
contract with the principal. For the breach of that implied warranty, the agent
is liable to the injured party for all damages which flow naturally from reliance
upon the agent's assertion of authority." 68 From an analysis of cases, it will
be found that this rule of liability upon an implied warranty remains in force
by the weight of authority in this country.69
To establish this liability on an implied warranty, the purported agent
must make representations that he has authority to act in behalf of a prin-
cipal.70 The Restatement takes the position that this representation does not
65. 1 MECHEm, AGENCY § 1362 (1914).
66. Wallace v. Bentley, 77 Cal. 19, 18 Pac. 788 (1888) ; Jacobs v. Williams, 85 Conn.
215, 82 Atl. 202 (1912) ; Tedder v. Riggin, 65 Fla. 153, 61 So. 244 (1913) ; Doolittle v.
Murray, 134 Iowa 536, 111 N. W. 999 (1907); Noyes v. Loring, 55 Me. 408 (1867);
Abbey v. Chase, 6 Cush. 54 (Mass. 1850); Cole v. O'Brien, 34 Neb. 68, 51 N. W. 316
(1892) ; Noe v. Gregory, 7 Daly 283 (N. Y. 1877) ; Russell v. Koonce, 104 N. C. 237,
10 S. E. 256 (1889) ; Haupt v. Vint, 68 W. Va. 657, 70 S. E. 702 (1911).
67. Boelter v. National Mfrs. Bank, 194 Wis. 1, 215 N. W. 436 (1927).
68. Harriss v. Tams, 258 N. Y, 229, 179 N. E. 476, 478 (1932). Cardozo, C. J., in
New Georgia National Bank v. Lippmann, 249 N. Y. 307, 164 N. E. 108, 109, 60 A. L, R.
1344 (192&), stated that "at common law, the remedy against an agent signing a note
without authority was not upon the note itself, but for breach of an implied warranty."
69. Kohlberg v. Havens, 41 Cal. App. 222, 182 Pac. 467 (1919) ; Golden v. Ellwood,
299 Ill. 73, 132 N. E. 223 (1921); Chamberlain v. Spalding, 170 S. W. 2d 454 (Mo,
1943) ; Christensen v. Nielson, 73 Utah 603, 276 Pac. 645 (1929). In Groeltz v. Armstrong,
125 Iowa 39, 99 N. W. 128, 129 (1904), the rule is aptly stated: "It is well settled that an
agent purporting to act for and bind a principal whom he has no authority to bind, and who
does not thereby become bound, is liable, not on the contract which he attempts to make,
but for breach of implied warranty." The position taken by the RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 329 (1933), is stated as follows: "[A] person who purports to make a contract, convey-
ance, or representation on behalf of a principal whom he has no power to bind thereby be-
comes subject to liability to the other party thereto upon an implied warranty of authority,
unless he has manifested that he does not make such warranty or the other party knows
that the agent is not so authorized."
Contra: Lutz v. Van Heynigen Brokerage Co., 199 Ala. 620, 75 So. 284, 287 (1917).
The court in this case stated that "The manifest effect of our decision in Ware v. Morgan
.. was to exclude the recognition of the remedy by an action against the pseudo agent
on his implied warranty that he was authorized to contract for his identified principal.
.. .There are respectable authorities for the view, pronounced in more recent times,
that recognizes- the right of the contracting party, who has been disappointed by the
failure of the ostensible agent to possess authority to bind his ostensible principal, to
sue the ostensible agent for a breach of his implied warranty of authority to engage for
his disclosed principal .... [W]e do not feel justified at this late day in altering the very
clear doctrine set forth . . . in our case of Ware v. Morgan."
70. 1 MacnaE, AGENCY § 1366 (1914). "[1Un order to enable a plaintiff to main-
tain an action he must prove misrepresentation in fact,-that is to say, a representation
by the defendant that he was authorized to sign on behalf of an alleged principal when
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have to be expressly or directly made; it is enough if the agent misstates facts
which if true would authorize him to make a contract. 71 It is also important
to note here that many courts regard it immaterial that the representations
were made in strict good faith.72 The usual statement of this view is to the
effect that the agent is personally liable "even if he knew of his lack of
authority and assumed to act as if he were authorized, or whether he honestly
was of opinion that he possessed authority when as matter of fact he had
none." 73 Of course, if the representations were fraudulently made, an action in
tort for deceit would probably lie. But in order to provide a remedy in situ-
ations where the misrepresentation is innocently made, the courts, one text-
writer has said, "have invented the fiction that the agent 'warrants' his
authority whenever he makes a contract for his principal, and allow an action
for the breach of this warranty of authority." 74
Here again, the nature of the warranty of authority appears as an obli-
gation imposed by law. No sale has taken place, the agent is not liable on the
unauthorized contract, and yet the lav imposes upon him an absolute liability.
In Moore v. Maddock,75 Lehman, J., clearly stated that "An action for breach
of warranty rests upon a contract which the law implies.... The only promise
or warranty on the part of the defendant ... is implied by the law, regardless
of the defendant's actual intent."
INjURIEs SUSTAINED BEFORE SALE COMPLETED
What is the liability of a store or manufacturer when before a sale is
consummated, a container explodes causing injury? 76 Recovery has generally
not been allowed on an implied warranty basis. Illustrative of this view is
the case of Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores.77 Here the plaintiff was injured
when a bottle of tonic exploded. The plaintiff had not purchased this tonic.
The court denied recovery on the theory that since there was no sale, there
could be no warranty. Merchandise in a self service store is treated as the
in fact he was not so authorized,--but he need not prove that this misrepresentation
was due to an omission or wrong of the party signing." To complete the picture of
liability of the agent, it must be shown in addition to the misrepresentation, that the
agent in fact had no authority. Id. § 1366. Also the third party must have relied on the
misrepresentation which caused the injury. Id. § 1369.
71. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 329, comment c (1933).
72. Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39, 99 N. W. 128, 129 (1904): "In order to
establish the individual liability of the person thus purporting to act as agent, it is not
essential to show that his express or implied representations as to authority were in-
tentionally false." See also, Williams v. DeSoto Oil Co., 213 Fed. 194 (8th Cir. 1914) ;
Magaw v. Beals, 242 Mass. 321, 136 N. E. 174 (1922) ; Christensen v. Nielson, 73 Utah
603, 276 Pac. 645 (1929).
73. Magaw v. Beals, 242 Mass. 321, 136 N. E. 174, 175 (1922).
74. HUFFCUT, AGENCY § 183(2) (1901). See also Moore v. Maddock, 251 N. Y. 420,
167 N. E. 572, 574, 64 A. L. R. 1189 (1929), where the court says that "The doctrine
of an implied warranty is based upon a fiction.
75. 251 N. Y. 420, 167 N. E. 572, 573, 64 A. L. R. 1189 (1929).
76. This discussion does not intend to probe into the problem of whether the manu-
facturer or seller is the preferred person to stand the loss.
77. 319 Mass. 224, 65 N. E. 2d 305 (1946).
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property of the store until paid for.7s Thus, where there is an injury before
a sale, it would seem'impossible to find a warranty under section 15 of the
Sales Act.
Certain cases have come very close to the imposition of an implied
warranty. In Stolle v. Anheuser-Bsch,79 the plaintiff was injured when a
bottle of beer belonging to a customer exploded. The court applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and allowed recovery, saying, "Obviously this
should be at his [manufacturer's] risk. Public policy requires that the manu-
facturer should assume the risks and hazards of explosion incident to the
reasonable and ordinarily careful transportation and handling of these goods
in the usual course of business." 80 This sounds very much of absolute
liability. Still another decision is of the same tenor: "[I]f these goods are so
inherently dangerous from their frequent explosions ... that they cannot be
made safe, then placing them upon the market is indictable, as well as makes
the manufacturers and all vendors liable to actions for any damage accru-
ing." 81 While res ipsa loquitur has been applied in some of these cases, 82
it has been refused in others on the basis that the instrumentality was not
within the control of the defendant at the time of the accident.
8 3
What method of recovery does the plaintiff have in such cases? Again,
it is almost impossible to prove negligence in such cases.8 4 One plaintiff
attempted to show that title, passed when the bottle was removed from the
shelf, but this was rejected.85 Still another suggestion is to the effect that
recovery can be had on the basis of the doctrine of business invitee and thus
impose liability on the shop owner to provide safe premises.8 6
It is submitted that recovery can be had by implied warranty. Section
15 of the Sales Act only defines what warranties are implied in sales. It does
not include warranties in other kinds of transactions. Recovery should not
be sought under the Sales Act in these cases. Implied warranties are obliga-
tions imposed by law. A warranty may be imposed here as it is done in the
restaurant situation, the bailor-bailee cases or in the field of agency. The
78. Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 22 Tenn. App. 70, 118 S. W. 2d 561
(W. S. 1938).
79. 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497, 39 A. L. R. 1001 (1925).
80. 271 S. W. at 500.
81. Grant v. Graham. Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N. C. 256, 97 S. E. 27, 29, 4
A. L. R. 1090 (1918).
82. Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497, 39 A. L. R. 1001 (1925);
Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. 1087 (1912).
83. Wheeler v. Laurel Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743 (1916); Cashwell
v. Fayetteville PepsiCola Bottling Co., 174 N. C. 324, 93 S. E. 901 (1917); Glaser v.
Seitz, 35 Misc. 341, 71 N. Y. Supp. 942 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
84. The plaintiff has an impossible task because he cannot tell when the particular
bottle was made, what care was taken in the bottling process, or what treatment it was
given after being received in the particular store.-
85. Loch v. Confair, 63 A. 2d 24 (Pa. 1949). The court held that the customer has
possession only; this is not the equivalent of delivery as in a sale.
86. 47 COL. L. Rzv. 156 (1947).
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defendant has put on the market or offered for sale a product which has caused
injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is injured through no fault of his own.
Upon whom should the burden fall? 8 7 The tendency today is in the direction
of increased protection to the public. The reasons are well stated by Llewellyn,•
"That needed protection is twofold: to shift the immediate incidence of the
hazard of life in an industrial society away from the individual over to a
group which can distribute the loss; and to place the loss where the most
pressure will be exerted to keep down future losses .... The customer, barring
his own fault in use, should have no negligence to prove; that the article
was not up to its normal character should be enough." 88
CONCLUSION
It is thus seen that an implied warranty has been imposed in cases
involving bailment, the service of food and agent's representations. The
basis for this liability is founded upon reliance by the plaintiff on the superior
knowledge or skill of the defendant. These cases seem to indicate that there
is no substantial reason for limiting the doctrine of implied warranty to sales.
The Sales Act sets out what warranties will be implied where there is a
contract to sell or a present sale of goods. It does not attempt to set out what
warranties will be found in other transactions. A plaintiff can recover on
implied warranty irrespective of the Sales Act.
The reasons for implying a warranty are many. In many situations it
is almost impossible to prove negligence. Yet justice seems to require holding
the defendant liable. He can better distribute the loss. The imposition of
absolute liability on the defendant would encourage higher standards. A
strong public policy demands that maximum protection be afforded the
injured party in these situations. It has been suggested that the device most
ready at hand to effectuate this policy is ,an extension of the strict liability
of implied warranty.8 9
Implied warranty is an absolute obligation imposed by law. It has been
called nothing more than a method of shifting a loss which needs shifting; 90
or a fiction invented by the law to impose liability.91 At any rate the tendency
today is in the direction of an increased use of the implied warranty.92 There
is no basis in logic or policy for confining the doctrine .of implied warranty
to sales. ROBERT B. DEEN, JR.
CHARLES H. WARFIELD
87. 14 TENN. L. REv. 646 (1937).
88. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES § 341 (1930).
89. PROSSER, TORTS § 83 (1941).
90. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 34 3 (1930).
91. Moore v. Maddock, 251 N. Y. 420, 167 N. E. 572, 64 A. L. R. 1189 (1929).
92. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927); VOLD, SALES 469
(1913); Note, 1939 Wis. L. Rzv. 459; 1 VAND. L. REv. 467 (1948).
1949] NOTES
